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and €330 billion respectively are suitables. Bonds of sound banks could be conside-
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1. https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/mopo/strategy/prices-
tab/html/index.en.html.
2. In an interview, ECB Exec-
utive Board member Benoit
Coeuré said that the aca-
demic definition of
‘medium term’ is 18
months, but currently “it is
only normal that we see
inflation coming back more
slowly to the medium-term
objective”:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ress/inter/date/2014/html/
sp140116.en.html.
1 INTRODUCTION
There are clear benefits to price stability. High
inflation can distort corporate investment deci-
sions and the consumption behaviour of house-
holds. Changes to inflation redistribute real wealth
and income between different segments of soci-
ety, such as savers and borrowers, or young and
old. Price stability is therefore a fundamental
public good and it became a fundamental principle
of European Economic and Monetary Union. But
the European Treaties do not define price stability.
It was left to the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank (ECB) to quantify it: “Price stability is
defined as a year-on-year increase in the Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the
euro area of below 2%”1. The Governing Council has
also clarified that it aims to maintain inflation
below, but close to, two percent over the medium
term, though it has not quantified what ‘close-
ness’means, nor has it given a precise definition of
the ‘medium term’2. The clarification has been
widely interpreted to mean that the actual target of
the ECB is close to, but below, two percent infla-
tion in the medium term. 
In the current European circumstances, low over-
all euro-area inflation implies that in some euro-
area member states inflation has to be very low or
even negative in order to regain competitiveness
relative to the core. The lower the overall inflation
rate, the more periphery inflation rates will have
to fall in order to achieve the same competitive-
ness gains. Given that wages are often sticky and
rarely decline, significant unemployment
increases can result from the adjustment process.
In addition, lower-than-anticipated inflation under-
mines the sustainability of public and private debt
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if the debt contracts are long-term nominal con-
tracts. For governments, falling inflation rates
often mean that nominal tax revenues fall, which
makes the servicing or repayment of debt more
difficult.
Inflation in the euro area has been falling since
late 2011 and has been below one percent since
October 2013. Core inflation, a measure that
excludes volatile energy and food price develop-
ments, has developed similarly. Five of the 18
euro-area member countries (Cyprus, Greece, Por-
tugal, Slovakia and Spain) are already in deflation.
Even in the countries that are not in a recession,
such as Belgium, France and Germany, inflation
rates are well below the euro-area target of close to
but below two percent. More worryingly, the ECB’s
forecast suggests that inflation will not return to
close to two percent in the medium term.
Given the need to regain competitiveness, lower-
than-target inflation in the euro-area periphery can
be expected and is even desirable. However, to
facilitate adjustment and achieve the overall ECB
inflation objective, inflation in the euro area’s core
countries needs to stabilise and reach levels
above two percent. A key question for policymak-
ers is therefore why inflation rates are subdued in
core countries despite very accommodative mon-
etary policy conditions and the gradual revival of
economic growth. Policymakers must also con-
sider which monetary policies are suitable for
increasing aggregate inflation in the euro area,
while ensuring that the inflation differential
between the core and periphery remains. Finally,
unresolved banking-sector problems are making
the task of the ECB more difficult.
‘Given the need to regain competitiveness, lower-than-target inflation in the euro-area periphery
can be expected and is even desirable. To facilitate adjustment, inflation in the euro area’s core
countries needs to stabilise and reach levels above two percent.’
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Is there a risk that the euro area as a whole will
fall into outright deflation?
Inflation expectations have been falling since at
least mid-2012. Figure 2 on the next page pres-
ents expectations from two sources (an ECB
survey and a market-based indicator) and for two
maturities. The two-year-ahead expectations are
significantly below two percent and even below
one percent according to the market-based indi-
cator. In the period relevant for the ECB, inflation
expectations have thus become de-anchored from
two percent. Lack of ECB action when the ECB’s
own medium-term inflation forecasts fell below
the two percent threshold was a signal to markets
that probably resulted in the downward revision
of longer-term inflation expectations. The ECB is
now less effective in anchoring longer-term expec-
tations to, or close to, the two percent level.
There are four further reasons suggesting that the
ECB should already have adopted additional mon-
etary stimulus:
1 The cost of deviations from the current inflation
baseline is asymmetric;
2 The track record of inflationary forecasts and
expectations suggests that significant changes
in inflation are often unforeseen;
3 The Japanese experience suggests that long-
term market expectations can be persistently
upward-biased;
4 Earlier action can prevent being forced into
It is against this background that we discuss mon-
etary policy options to address low inflation in the
euro area. Evidently, structural and banking poli-
cies, wage-setting mechanisms and fiscal policies
also need to play a role in addressing the reces-
sion and the low-inflation problem. They are, how-
ever, not discussed in this Policy Contribution.
2 HETEROGENEOUS INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE EURO AREA
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the euro-area head-
line inflation rate has been moving downwards
since late 2011, while Panel B indicates a similar
trend for core inflation3. Panels A and B also high-
light major differences between euro-area coun-
tries. Countries in the euro-area periphery (which
we define as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain
and Portugal) had higher inflation rates than other
euro-area counties before the crisis, persisting
well into the crisis period. Only since 2013 has
inflation in the periphery clearly fallen below that
of the euro area as a whole4.
Several countries are already experiencing defla-
tion. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain
are in deflation, while the March 2014 inflation
rates in the Netherlands (0.1 percent), Ireland (0.3
percent), Italy (0.3 percent) and Latvia (0.2 per-
cent) are rather close to zero when measured by
headline inflation. But even in Germany and
France inflation has fallen below one percent.
3. This measure of core
inflation can be a proxy for
underlying price develop-
ments. Core inflation was
less volatile than headline
inflation and on average
between 1999 and 2014,
was 0.3 percentage points
per year lower than head-
line inflation, which is a rel-
atively small, though
non-negligible, difference.
4. Tax increases are partly
responsible for the delayed
fall in inflation rates during
the crisis: several of the
periphery countries
increased taxes, thereby
increasing inflation.
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Figure 1: Inflationary developments in the euro area (% change compared to the same month of the
previous year), January 1999 to March 2014
Source: Bruegel calculation using data from Eurostat’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices dataset. Note: core inflation is
defined as the ‘Overall index excluding energy and unprocessed food’. Data for core inflation in Slovenia is not available for
the full period and therefore this country is not included.
Second, the ECB’s inflation forecasts and market
expectations have been unable to predict signifi-
cant deviations from the two percent threshold
(Figure 3). When there was a sizeable deviation,
ECB forecasts and market expectations both pre-
dicted a gradual return to two percent, which hap-
pened in some cases (see, for example, the
December 2011 forecast of the ECB), but most of
the time did not.
Third, the fact that long-term inflation expectations
in the euro area have so far not deviated too much
from two percent should not be taken as a guar-
antee that inflation will return to the two percent
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much larger unconventional policy measures
later, when inflation falls so much that no other
option remains.
First, at a low level of inflation, the costs of devia-
tion from the ECB’s forecast inflation are highly
asymmetric. If inflation is higher than forecast, it
would mean that inflation would be closer to the
two percent threshold – a benign development.
But if inflation is lower than forecast, then coun-
tries in the euro-area periphery would have to
maintain even lower inflation or higher deflation,
with risks for the sustainability of public and pri-
vate debt.
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Figure 2: Inflation expectations: ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and market-based
inflationary expectations in the euro area, 2002Q1-2014Q2
Source: ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and Datastream. Note: In the ECB’s survey the horizon of ‘Long term’
is not specified. Market-based expectations refer to overnight inflation swaps, which can be used as a market-based proxy for
future inflation expectations. The 2014Q2 values of market-based expectations are the average during 1-23 April 2014, while
the latest available values for the SPF are end of March 2014.
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Figure 3: Vintages of inflation forecasts/expectations and actual inflation in the euro area
Source: Datastream, ECB. Note: The HICP is defined as a 12-month average rate of change; in panel A, the ECB Staff projections
indicate a range referred to as “the projected average annual percentage changes” (see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strat-
egy/ecana/html/table.en.html). For simplicity, we take the average of the given range. In panel B, market-based expectations
refer to overnight inflation swaps, which can be used as a proxy for future inflation expectations.
level without additional monetary policy meas-
ures. In Japan, long-term inflation expectations
remained about one percent on average between
1996 and 2013, though actual inflation was
slightly below zero (-0.1 percent, Figure 4). The
average forecast error for the 6-10 year inflation
forecasts made in Japan between 1996 and 2003
was 1.1 percentage points5.
At the same time, price developments in the euro
area are still significantly different from Japan
during the past two decades. In Japan, about half
of the items in the consumption basket fell in price
during the period when the average inflation rate
was almost zero (Claeys, Hüttl and Merler, 2014).
In the euro area there has been an increase in the
share of items in the HICP basket that are already
in deflation in recent months (to about 20 percent
of the entire HICP basket), but this share is not
very high (and similar to shares observed in 2005
when the inflation rate was close to two percent in
the euro area) and is still significantly lower than
in Japan.
Overall, inflation has been falling significantly and
so have inflation expectations. Inflation forecasts
have proved consistently too optimistic about the
return of inflation to the two percent threshold in
the euro area and the one percent target in Japan.
The ECB’s own forecast suggests that euro-area
inflation will not return to close to two percent in
the medium term, and we see a substantial risk
that it will not return to this level even in the longer
term. 
3 HOW TO ADDRESS LOW INFLATION IN A
HETEROGENEOUS MONETARY UNION?
3.1 Key constraints
The ECB's task is complicated by two very special
circumstances. First, the euro area is a heteroge-
neous monetary union in which the process of rel-
ative price adjustment between its different parts
is ongoing. This adjustment is a consequence of
the very substantial past divergence in prices. To
better understand the resulting problem for the
ECB, it is useful to resort to a simple example of a
two-country monetary union. In the monetary
union, one region (say periphery) is depressed
and runs a zero inflation rate, while the other
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5. We calculated the
forecast error as the
difference between the
inflation forecast made in a
certain year, minus the
average inflation rate from
six to ten years later.
Therefore, the most recent
forecast for which we could
calculate the actual
forecast error was made in
2003.
region (say core) has an inflation rate of one per-
cent, still below the two percent target, even
though there is almost full employment. The mon-
etary stimulus should result in aggregate inflation
in the monetary union increasing to the two-per-
cent target. However, since there has to be a rela-
tive price adjustment between the periphery and
the core, the monetary stimulus should ensure
that the inflation differential between the two
regions remains in place.
The stimulus must therefore increase inflation and
activity both in the core and the periphery. The
necessary relative price adjustment implies that
inflation in the core should increase above the
target, while periphery inflation has to stay below
it. If the stimulus would not have an impact on the
core, but only the periphery, then it would under-
mine the necessary price-adjustment process.
The second problem for the ECB is that the process
of bank balance-sheet repair is ongoing. When
several banks have vulnerable capital and liquid-
ity positions, a monetary stimulus aimed at
increasing bank lending to the private sector is
less effective, similar to what happened after the
three-year longer-term refinancing operations
(LTRO) in late 2011 and early 2012, when banks
increased lending to governments and accumu-
lated reserves at the ECB. In addition, the ECB is
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Figure 4: Long-term inflation expectations and
actual outcomes in Japan
Source: Consensus Economics (2014) (expectations) and IMF
(actual inflation). Note: this figure is reproduced using our data
sources from Figure 7 in Antolin-Diaz (2014). There are two
observations per year, in April and October. For actual inflation
we plot the change in the all-items consumer price index com-
pared to the same quarter of previous year in the quarter
before the forecast was made.
6. http://www.bankofeng-
land.co.uk/publications/Pag
es/news/2013/027.aspx.
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dealing with the quality of banks’ balance sheets
in the context of the asset quality review and
stress test. Clearly, fixing the bank-lending chan-
nel cannot be done by monetary policy but
requires action on the structural weaknesses of
banks’ balance sheets. A key question is if possi-
ble monetary policy measures (like new long-term
liquidity provision to banks, asset purchase pro-
grammes from banks and/or from other private
sector asset holders, or negative ECB deposit rates
for banks) would be conducive to increased infla-
tion under current circumstances. An equally
important question is whether such a monetary
policy measure would remove the incentive to fix
the structural problems in the banking system
where necessary.
3.2 Policies to address low inflation in the
special euro-area setting
Different policies could be deployed to increase
inflation and inflationary expectations:
• Reduce the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO)
rate to zero percent;
• Negative rates for banks’ deposits at the ECB;
• Ending the sterilisation of bond holdings from
the Securities Markets Programme (SMP);
• New long-term (eg three years or longer) refi-
nancing operations, possibly made conditional
on net lending to the private sector;
• Asset purchases:
– Purchase of euro-area or European debt
(debts of various European rescue funds
and the European Investment Bank);
– Purchase of sovereign debt of euro-area
member states;
– Purchase of non-sovereign debt such as the
debt of non-financial corporations, asset
backed securities (ABS) or debt of financial
institutions; 
– Foreign exchange intervention: purchase of
foreign assets, such as non-euro area sov-
ereign debt or corporate debt. Given the G7
statement of February 2013 by central bank
governors and finance ministers reaffirming
the “longstanding commitment to market
determined exchange rates and to consult
closely in regard to actions in foreign
exchange markets”, this policy measure is
not discussed further6. 
Reducing ECB interest rates
The current 0.25 percent ECB main refinancing rate
could be marginally reduced, but the impact of
such a small reduction is unlikely to significantly
change inflation expectations. In addition, the ECB
could reduce the deposit rate, which banks receive
when depositing liquidity at the ECB, from zero cur-
rently to negative territory. Since currently banks
can hold excess reserves on their current account
at the ECB at zero interest, a negative deposit rate
should be accompanied by the same negative
interest rate on excess reserves, to avoid the shift-
ing of all deposits to excess reserves (Figure 5
shows that banks shifted half of their deposits to
excess reserves when the deposit rate was
reduced to zero). A negative deposit rate would
mean that banks pay interest for placing a deposit
at the central bank. This would reduce the incen-
tive for banks to hold deposits and excess reserves
at the central bank and should therefore promote
other uses by the banks of liquidity, such as
greater lending to the rest of the economy. How-
ever, the sum of banks’ deposits and their excess
reserves at the ECB is declining fast (Figure 5), and
with the normalisation of money markets they may
return to their pre-crisis close-to-zero values. This
implies that the direct impact of a negative deposit
rate, in terms of changing the incentives to hold
deposits and excess reserves, would be minimal.
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Figure 5: The ECB’s interest rate on the deposit
facility, banks’ deposits at the ECB’s deposit
facility and banks’ excess reserves at the ECB,
January 2007 to April 2014
Source: Bruegel calculation based on ECB data. Note: banks’
excess reserve is the reserves banks hold at their current
account with the ECB minus the minimum reserve requirement.
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‘In normal times, central banks do not engage in long-term liquidity operations. But, when the
interbank market became dysfunctional during the crisis, several euro-area periphery countries
underwent a sudden stop in external financing. In response, the ECB provided ample liquidity.’
It is difficult to assess the quantitative impact of a
negative deposit rate on credit and inflation, but
the example of Denmark does not suggest strong
effects. In July 2012, the Danish central bank
reduced its deposit rate for banks to -0.2 percent
and kept a negative rate until the 24 April 2014.
The main motivation for the negative deposit rate
was to discourage the inflow of capital into Den-
mark, because with the intensification of the euro
crisis, investors searched for safe assets. The
most direct effects were the reduction of Danish
treasury-bill yields below zero and a depreciation
of the Danish Krona against the euro by about half
a percent from 7.43 to 7.46. This change was quite
sizeable for Denmark, where the euro exchange
rate is kept very stable. A negative ECB deposit
rate may lower treasury-bill yields especially of
core euro-area countries and weaken the
exchange rate of the euro, which would increase
inflation.
Some commentators (eg Papadia, 2013) have
argued that banks would in fact increase loan
interest rates in order to compensate for the loss
from their deposits at the ECB. However, the
Danish experience also showed that a negative
deposit rate does not necessarily have any impact
on banks’ loan rates to their clients. Another con-
cern is the impact of negative deposit rates on
money-market activity. The ECB’s decision to cut
the deposit rate to zero has already led to the clo-
sure of various money-market funds and could
drain liquidity in the money markets7. In Denmark,
however, money-market volumes decreased only
slightly after the introduction of the negative cen-
tral bank deposit rate. Investors exiting money-
market funds would need to find other
investments, pushing liquidity to markets with
characteristics similar to money markets.
Stopping the sterilisation of SMP holdings
Another possible measure would be stopping the
sterilisation of the ECB’s Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP) holdings. Under the SMP, the ECB
bought about €220 billion of Greek, Irish, Por-
tuguese, Italian and Spanish government bonds.
At present, there are €175.5 billion of SMP bonds
left, the maturities of which are not publicly dis-
closed by the ECB. The bonds are held to maturity
and the purchases are entirely sterilised. Stopping
their sterilisation would inject €175.5 billion into
euro-area money markets.
However, the SMP was launched to address the
malfunctioning of securities markets and restore
an appropriate monetary policy transmission
mechanism, while not affecting the stance of mon-
etary policy8. A key feature of the programme was
sterilisation. Falling short of that commitment and
changing the objective at this point would be prob-
lematic, because it might undermine trust in the
ECB’s other commitments. Importantly, the Out-
right Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme is
also designed to be sterilised9. In the ongoing judi-
cial discussions on the OMT10, stopping the steril-
isation of SMP holdings would give a powerful
argument to the plaintiffs, who could say that the
ECB’s OMT commitments are unreliable.
New long-term (eg three years or longer)
refinancing operations
In normal times, central banks do not engage in
long-term liquidity operations. One reason for this
is moral hazard: long-term central bank financing
at rates below what banks could get from the
market might encourage excessive risk taking and
keep insolvent banks alive. However, when the
interbank market became dysfunctional during
the crisis, several countries in the euro-area
periphery underwent a sudden stop in external
financing. To address the problem, the ECB pro-
vided ample liquidity. The maturity of the ECB’s liq-
uidity operations were then extended from three
months to six and twelve months. In December
2011 and in February 2012 the ECB also con-
ducted two extraordinary Longer Term Refinanc-
ing Operations (LTROs) with maturities of three
years, from which banks in the euro area borrowed
almost €1 trillion.
7. http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-07-06/jpmor-
gan-shuts-europe-money-
market-funds-on-ecb-rate-c
ut.html.
8. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pr/date/2010/html/pr
100510.en.html. 
9. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pr/date/2012/html/pr
120906_1.en.html. 
10. See for instance in Wolff
(2013). 
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The ECB also introduced a policy of ‘full allotment’
for all ECB liquidity operations. Under this proce-
dure, the control of central bank liquidity is effec-
tively moved from the central bank to the banking
system, because banks can access all the central
bank liquidity they need at a variable rate (if they
provide sufficient eligible collateral).
These operations, along with the revised collateral
policy (expanding and changing assets’ eligibility
requirements in order to mitigate possible con-
straints arising from collateral shortage) allowed
liquidity-strained banks to refinance a large por-
tion of their balance sheets through central bank
lending, available at a low interest rate and long-
term maturity. In a heavily bank-based system,
such as the euro area, these measures were
essential to avoid a financial and economic melt-
down11.
However, these operations did little to trigger addi-
tional lending to the private sector (even though
they may have helped to prevent a collapse of
existing lending). To a great extent, banks either
deposited the cheap central bank funding at the
ECB for rainy days, or purchased higher yielding
government bonds. Thereby, the LTROs in effect
supported liquidity, ensured stable long-term
(three-year) financing of banks, subsidised the
banking system and helped to restore its prof-
itability, and temporarily supported distressed
government bond markets. Considering the alter-
native of a potentially escalating financial crisis,
these developments were beneficial. However, the
LTROs might have delayed bank restructuring and
prolonged the existence of non-viable banks.
For two main reasons, the current situation is very
different from the situation when the two three-
year LTROs were adopted.
First, one reason for the failure of the 2011-12
LTROs to foster lending was the weak balance
sheet of the banks and uncertainty about the
integrity of the euro area. With the ECB’s Compre-
hensive Assessment, the structural weaknesses
of the banking sector are gradually being mended.
In addition, speculation about the break-up of the
euro area has become less relevant. Therefore, a
new LTRO might be more effective, in particular if
ECB financing is made conditional on banks
increasing their net lending to the non-financial
private sector economy (similar to the Bank of
England’s Funding for Lending Scheme; see
Darvas, 2013; Wolff 2013). Such conditions, by
definition, would exclude the use by banks of ECB
liquidity to purchase government bonds. With col-
lateralised lending to banks, the ECB exposure to
credit risk is minimal. In addition, the central bank
would not replace the banking system in supply-
ing and allocating credit to the non-financial pri-
vate sector. A new LTRO could therefore be a good
option to foster credit growth.
Second, the current situation is different because
there is no longer a liquidity crisis. In fact, some
banks are repaying their loans from the ECB early
(Figure 6), even though they have to replace that
funding at a higher cost from other sources. The
take-up of LTRO liquidity might therefore be lim-
ited and the programme could be ineffective in
triggering lending and inflation.
4 ASSET PURCHASES
For any central bank, asset purchases always
involve difficult choices about what and how much
to buy. The central bank becomes an important
buyer in financial markets and therefore can be
subject to pressure from politicians and compa-
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Figure 6: Use of Eurosystem liquidity
(€ billions), January 2003 to February 2014
Source/note: the ECB does not provide a country breakdown
of the use of its facilities. Data come from National Central
Banks but the reporting standards differ. Therefore the length
of the time series is not the same for all countries and for
some countries data does not seem to be publicly available.
11. Another crucial ECB
measure during the crisis
was Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA), an emer-
gency liquidity line pro-
vided by national central
banks (with the consent of
the ECB’s Governing Coun-
cil) to solvent banks that
exceptionally and tem-
porarily do not have enough
(or sufficiently high quality
collateral) to access normal
Eurosystem operations.
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12. The expression credit
easing is also used when
non-government securities
are purchased.
13. The potential impact of
QE on wealth inequality has
recently been in the spot-
light, see Bank of England
(2012).
nies. This is a powerful argument for central banks
to act early in order to avoid a low-inflation trap, in
which standard monetary policy measures
become less effective. The longer an asset-pur-
chase programme is delayed in a situation in
which inflation is already very low, the greater the
risk that an even larger purchase programme will
ultimately be needed.
In response to the global financial and economic
crisis, the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and
Bank of Japan engaged in large-scale asset pur-
chase programmes, or quantitative easing (QE)12.
From the beginning of 2009 to March 2014, the
Federal Reserve purchased $1.9 trillion (11.9 per-
cent of US GDP) of US long-term Treasury bonds
and $1.6 trillion (9.6 percent of US GDP) of mort-
gage-backed securities. Between January 2009
and November 2012, the Bank of England pur-
chased £375 billion (24 percent of GDP) of mostly
medium- and long-term government bonds. The
Bank of Japan started a new round of asset pur-
chases in March 2013 and plans to buy per year
50 trillion yen of government bonds (10.4 percent
of 2013 GDP), 1 trillion yen of exchange-traded
funds (0.2 percent of GDP) and 50 billion yen of
Japanese real estate investment trusts (0.01 per-
cent of GDP), in order to double the country’s mon-
etary base in two years. In addition to such asset
purchases, these central banks also implemented
programmes to support liquidity in various mar-
kets. The ECB has made few asset purchases so
far but reacted to the crisis by providing liquidity to
the banking system. The size of the balance
sheets of the central banks therefore increased
for different reasons (Figure 7).
Asset purchases can be used if interest rates
reach the zero lower bound and refinancing oper-
ations are ineffective, as discussed above. There
are a number of channels through which asset
purchases can influence monetary conditions and
thereby economic activity and prices:
• Money multiplier: if the money multiplier (the
ratio of broad monetary aggregates to the mon-
etary base) is stable, then the asset-purchase-
induced increase in the monetary base will
increase monetary aggregates, through more
credit to non-financial corporations and house-
holds, which can boost demand. 
• Altering yields: purchase by the central bank of
a particular asset will reduce the net supply of
that asset to the private sector and increase its
price and thereby reduce the return that it
yields. 
• Portfolio rebalancing: Unless the purchased
asset is a very close substitute for cash (such
as short-term treasury bills), investors who
sold the asset will search for other investment
opportunities, pushing up prices and reducing
yields in other markets too.
• Exchange rate: via portfolio rebalancing, previ-
ous asset holders could invest in assets
denominated in other currencies and thereby
depreciate the home currency. This in turn
might increase import prices and thereby infla-
tion, but could also boost export production and
thereby economic activity.
• Wealth effect: the increase in asset prices can
lead to a wealth effect for the asset holders,
which can also increase consumption or invest-
ment13.
• Signalling: asset purchases by the central bank
when the zero lower bound on interest rates is
0
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Figure 7: Size of balance sheets of various
central banks (in % of GDP)
Source: FRED, IMF.
‘There is a powerful argument for central banks to act early in order to avoid a low-inflation trap.
The longer an asset-purchase programme is delayed when inflation is already very low, the
greater the risk that an even larger purchase programme will ultimately be needed.’
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reached could signal to market participants
that the central bank is serious about further
easing monetary conditions. This can have an
impact on inflation expectations and the
expected future path of policy rates, which
would lead to a reduction in real interest rates
today. 
4.2 How would these channels work in the euro
area, and in particular, in core and periphery
countries?
The experience of the past few years in countries
that have implemented asset purchases is that
the money multiplier is unstable and fell signifi-
cantly in parallel to the expansion of the monetary
base. Figure 8 shows that the in the US and the UK,
M3 kept growing at about the same rate even
when the monetary base doubled, thus halving
the money multiplier. Most likely the money mul-
tiplier would be similarly unstable in the euro area
after asset purchases, so the money multiplier
channel would not be effective.
The ECB’s balance sheet increased by 112 percent
between September 2008 and June 2012, and
has decreased by 30 percent since then primarily
because of the repayment by banks of the LTROs.
The decline in the balance sheet as such is not an
indication of tighter monetary conditions, but
rather reflects the fact that liquidity conditions in
the inter-bank market have normalised.
The lowering of nominal yields is unlikely to be a
powerful channel in the core, while it might have a
somewhat greater impact in the periphery. In core
euro-area countries, both government bond yields
and private-sector borrowing costs are currently
very low. The yield on the 10-year German bund is
about 1.5 percent per year, but even in Italy and
Spain 10-year yields are about 3.1 percent, close
to yields of the US government. In terms of corpo-
rate lending rates, nominal private sector borrow-
ing rates are lower in the euro-area core than in the
UK and just slightly higher than in the US – these
two countries that have already implemented
large-scale asset purchases (Panel A of Figure 9).
Since inflation is also expected to be lower in the
euro-area core than in the US, real lending rates
are slightly higher in the euro area than in the US,
but still well below their pre-crisis values. There-
fore, lowering real yields by shifting inflation
expectations could be somewhat more effective
in the core, but the decline in real rates is likely to
be limited.
For the periphery, nominal lending rates to non-
financial corporations are higher than in the core,
and because of even lower inflation expectations
than in the core, real interest rates are significantly
higher. To what extent the yield differential
between the lending rates in core and periphery
countries reflects financial fragmentation and
greater credit risk in the periphery remains an
open question. At the height of the euro crisis in
the summer of 2012, both factors likely played
major roles. Since then, fragmentation within the
euro area has eased. To the extent that financial
fragmentation continues to play a significant role,
ECB measures to limit fragmentation, such as
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asset purchases impacting either directly or indi-
rectly the borrowing costs of non-financial corpo-
rations, are justified. At the same time, asset
purchases can have an indirect impact on credit
risk via improved economic conditions.
A major question is the importance of changes to
real interest rates for the ongoing relative price
adjustment between the euro-area core and
periphery. Taylor (1999) estimated the semi-elas-
ticity of consumption and investment with respect
to the real interest rate in G7 countries. He found
that interest sensitivity was significantly higher in
France and Germany than in Italy. Therefore, the
same decline in real interest rates (either because
of an increase in inflationary expectations or a
lower nominal yield) would be more expansionary
in core countries than in Italy (and probably in
other periphery countries too). As we have argued,
the scope for a decline in real rates is less in the
core than in the periphery. Therefore, cutting real
rates to the private sector could be broadly neu-
tral for the ongoing relative price adjustment
within the euro area, because in the core, limited
scope for reduction is accompanied by large inter-
est rate sensitivity, while in the periphery, greater
scope for reduction is accompanied by small inter-
est rate sensitivity.
Portfolio rebalancing would probably work both in
the core and the periphery. For example, investors
holding long-term German government bonds
probably have a preference for safe long-term
assets. If the net supply of such assets to the pri-
vate sector declines, previous asset owners would
most likely search for other fixed-income instru-
ments with similar characteristics, such as bonds
of major banks or non-financial corporations head-
quartered in Germany or other core countries.
Such a rebalancing would favour the financing of
these corporations, which might have an impact
on their investment decisions, in particular for
companies that finance investment through
credit.
A weaker euro exchange rate could directly help
to lift inflation because of its impact on import
prices. The exchange-rate effect through exports
would likely favour both the core and periphery,
but would have different impacts. Since core coun-
tries with large trade surpluses have bigger trad-
able sectors, their export performances would
likely be boosted more than the exports of periph-
ery countries. Since labour markets are tighter in
core countries, an export expansion would more
likely translate into wage increases, while this is
less likely to happen in the periphery because of
Euro-area core Euro-area periphery United Kingdom United States
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Figure 9: Lending rates to non-financial corporations in the euro area, UK and US
Source: Bruegel based on ECB (lending rates in EU countries), IMF (inflation forecasts) and St. Louis FRED (US nominal inter-
est rates). Note: Two data points per year are shown, one corresponding to the spring publication of the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook (WEO, published typically in April) and the other corresponds to the autumn WEO (published typically in October).
The nominal interest rate is the average over six months before the publication of the WEO. The real lending rates were calcu-
lated using a 2-year ahead inflation forecast from the WEO databases up until October 2007 (due to lack of forecasts for longer
horizons), while a 5-year ahead forecast average was used starting from April 2008. Inflation forecasts were relatively stable
in pre-2008 WEOs but showed larger variations after 2008 and therefore our choice for considering different time horizons for
inflation forecast before 2008 and from 2008 may not distort much the comparability of the two periods. The latest data for
the US is Q1 2014, and Feb 2014 for the Euro area and the UK. The Euro area core and periphery is calculated as a GDP weighted
average with fixed weights.
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high unemployment rates. A weaker euro
exchange rate could thus help maintain the infla-
tion differential between the core and periphery.
However, we also acknowledge that a weaker
exchange rate would mean that the euro area’s
current account surplus would increase further. It
would mean a sort of beggar-thy-neighbour policy,
yet the mandate of the ECB is to maintain price
stability in the euro area and not to safeguard
global imbalances, which have many other
causes.
Finally, asset purchases could also have a ‘sig-
nalling’ impact on financing conditions in the euro
area. Buying assets would show the determina-
tion to act, which would affect inflation expecta-
tions and the anticipated path of policy rates. How
this would work in different countries is uncertain.
4.2 Size of the asset purchase programme
Working out the appropriate size of asset pur-
chases is far from easy. Some analysis consid-
ered the total amount of asset purchases by the
Bank of England and the Fed and suggested simi-
lar magnitudes for the euro area (20 to 25 percent
of GDP, ie €1.9 trillion to €2.4 trillion). In our view,
that is an inadequate benchmark, because a large
share of asset purchases by the Fed and Bank of
England were crisis-response measures, and the
assets were accumulated over five years. The ECB
dealt with the crisis in a different way (using liq-
uidity operations) and the situation in the euro
area is very different now.
A more relevant benchmark could be the amount
purchased by the Federal Reserve in its third
round of quantitative easing (QE3). This round of
QE was announced in light of the weak economic
situation of the US economy at a time when the
acute phase of the financial crisis was over – a sit-
uation that is similar to the current euro-area situ-
ation. In September 2012, the Fed announced it
would purchase $40 billion (€29 billion) of agency
mortgage-backed securities per month, increased
to $85 billion (€61 billion) in December 2012 (by
adding $45 billion per month of Treasuries). Given
that the euro area’s economy is about 30 percent
smaller than the US economy, the same size, as a
share of GDP, would be between €20 and €40bil-
lion per month in the euro area.
The ideal way to select the size of asset purchases
in the euro area would be through assessing its
expected impact on inflation. However, it is rather
difficult to measure this impact even in the US and
the UK, where large-scale asset purchases have
been conducted, and it even more difficult to
assess in the euro area.
Joyce et al (2012), Gagnon et al (2011) and Meier
(2009) argued that asset purchase programmes
have had a strong direct effect by reducing long-
term government bond yields by about 50-100
basis points in the UK and US. Hancock and Pass-
more (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jor-
gensen (2013) reported similar findings for the
Fed's mortgage-backed security (MBS) purchase
programme in the US.
Conclusions on the impact on GDP and inflation
differ in magnitude, though all research papers
report positive impacts. For the US for instance,
Chung et al (2012) estimated that the combina-
tion of QE1 and QE2 raised the level of real GDP by
three percent and inflation by one percent (an
impact equivalent to a cut in the federal funds rate
of around 300 basis points). Chen et al (2012)
found that QE2 increased GDP growth by 0.4 per-
cent, but had a minimal impact on inflation (equiv-
alent to an effect of a 50-basis point cut in the
federal funds rate). In a recent paper Weale and
Wieladek (2014) estimated that asset purchases
equivalent to one percent of GDP led, respectively
in the US and the UK, to a 0.36 and 0.18 percent-
age-point increase in real GDP and to a 0.38 and
0.3 percentage-point increase in CPI after five to
eight quarters.
The share of capital markets is smaller in the euro
area than in the US and the UK, the health of euro-
area banks has not been restored and nominal
interest rates are rather low in core euro-area
countries. It is therefore difficult to estimate the
impact of asset purchases on inflation in the euro
area, but most likely the effects are different from
those in the US and UK. Assuming a 0.20 percent-
age point inflation effect of a one percent of GDP
asset purchase in the euro area, a yearly asset
purchase of about four percent of euro area GDP
(about €400 billion) would lead to an inflation
increase of approximately 0.8 percentage points
after 18 months. Since core inflation in the euro
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area is about 1.0 percent now, such an increase
would move it close to two percent. Since we do
not know the exact size of the impact, we propose
to commence with €35 billion of asset purchases
per month, which would be close (as a share of
GDP) to the $85 billion per month purchase of the
Fed under QE3. Starting with a much lower volume
could be seen as too timid to have a substantial
effect. Due to the uncertainty in the transmission,
we propose that the size of the purchases should
be reviewed after three months. The relevant cri-
teria for the review should be the impact on actual
(headline and core) inflation as well as on infla-
tion expectations. Tapering should start only once
inflation and inflation expectations have
increased substantially.
4.3 Design principles for an asset-purchase
programme
How could an ECB asset-purchase programme be
designed and what would the purchase of differ-
ent assets mean for monetary conditions in the
periphery and the core, given the potentially dif-
ferent quality of bank balance sheets? What are
the limits of the different instruments? In our view,
the ECB will have to choose which assets to buy
using five main criteria.
• First, the ECB should buy assets that will be
most effective in terms of influencing inflation,
through the channels we have described. 
• Second, there should be sufficient volumes of
assets available, to ensure that the ECB can
purchase enough while not buying up whole
markets. 
• Third, the ECB should try to minimise the impact
on the private-sector financing process. While
QE by definition changes relative prices, the
ECB should avoid buying in small markets in
which its purchases would distort market pric-
ing too much. The more the ECB becomes a
player in a market, the more it can be subject
to political and private sector pressures when
it wants to reverse the purchases.
• Fourth, the ECB should buy only on the sec-
ondary markets in order to allow the portfolio-
rebalancing channel to work effectively.
Purchasing on the primary market would imply
the direct financing of entities, which should be
avoided.
• Fifth, the assets should only originate from the
euro area and be denominated in euros,
because of the 2013 G7 agreement noted in
section 3.2. 
In principle, the ECB could decide to buy any
asset, except government securities on the pri-
mary market, which is clearly ruled out by the
Treaty. In practice, the ECB’s task will be more com-
plex than it has been for the Fed, the Bank of Eng-
land and the Bank of Japan given the peculiarities
of the euro area:
a Bank lending is much more important than in
the UK and the US; 
b There is no euro-area wide sovereign asset
(beyond the limited amounts of securities
issued by the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) and the EU-wide bonds of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank and European
Commission); instead, each member state
issues sovereign debt and there are major dif-
ferences in public debt levels (and thereby in
their perceived sustainability) in different
member states; 
c The outstanding stock of privately-issued debt
securities is smaller (relative to GDP) than in
the US and the UK, and the roles of privately-
issued debt securities vary widely in different
euro-area member states. 
4.4 Should there be a credit rating requirement
for the assets to be purchased?
An important question is to what degree the ECB
should care about risk. A number of points need
to be considered:
• The risks in purchasing asset are fundamen-
tally different from the risks inherent in collat-
eralised central-bank lending. In the latter case,
the risk to the ECB is well contained by the high
haircuts applied and the fact that the bank is
the counterparty, which remains liable for
repayment even if there is a default on the col-
lateral. In the case of a purchase, the haircut to
the face value is determined by the markets
and the risk is taken directly onto the ECB’s bal-
ance sheet.
• The ECB would take on board significant risk via
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asset purchases under three circumstances:
(a) systemic risk, ie risk when all asset classes
are highly correlated, (b) when the purchased
portfolio is not diversified enough and concen-
trated on a few assets in large volumes, and (c)
when market prices are distorted and therefore
do not reflect well the riskiness of assets. 
– Systemic risk: it is the role of a central bank
to address systemic risk and the ECB would
in any case be heavily exposed to it also via
normal central bank operations.
– Diversification: given the quantities that
would be bought under an asset purchase
programme and assuming a proper diversi-
fication of risk, the ECB could make a profit
on its portfolio if it buys assets at non-dis-
torted prices. Buying many high-risk assets
is therefore not problematic as such,
because high returns would on average
compensate for defaulting assets. 
– Distorted market pricing: market prices can
be distorted because of market failures (eg
the pricing of US subprime securities before
the crisis) or because of central bank inter-
vention in markets. To reduce the magnitude
of the latter, it is imperative that the ECB
does not buy up whole markets, but limits
its purchase in each market to a small share.
The less the ECB buys in any given market,
the less risk it will take on board because the
market distortion would be kept to a mini-
mum. If market-pricing mechanisms are fun-
damentally wrong or if the ECB’s purchases
(including the anticipation of such pur-
chases) materially changes the market pric-
ing of the asset, only then would the ECB risk
significant losses. 
• The Treaty gives a mandate to the ECB to main-
tain price stability, not to protect its balance
sheet. 
Given these considerations, we recommend a
reasonably low threshold for credit risk, but
suggest that some criteria on riskiness should be
adopted, because the ECB should not turn itself
into a high-risk investment fund. Restricting asset
purchases only to the eligible collateral (without
any additional eligibility criterion) is an
appropriate threshold and therefore this is our
recommendation14. The pool of eligible collateral
has also the great advantage that the ECB already
has a well-defined list of eligible assets and
therefore the use of this list would limit lobbying
activities for what the ECB should buy. It is
important to highlight that our suggestion differs
from the ECB’s revealed preference, because
during the 2009-12 Covered Bond Purchase
Programmes (CBPPs), the only previous examples
of ECB unsterilised asset purchases, the criteria
for purchases was the eligibility of the assets as
collateral for refinancing operations with the ECB
and a minimum rating of AA or equivalent, awarded
by at least one of the major rating agencies15.
4.5 The pool of eligible assets
According to the ECB, total marketable assets
eligible as collateral represented almost €14
trillion at the end of 2013, equivalent to 146
percent of euro-area GDP16. Figure 10 shows that
about half of the Eurosystem’s eligible collateral
pool at the end of 2013 comprised government
bonds, with €6.37 trillion of central government
securities and €0.42 trillion of regional
government securities. The other half was split
between uncovered bank bonds (€2.28 trillion),
covered bank bonds (€1.53 trillion), corporate
bonds (€1.46 trillion), asset-backed securities
(€0.76 trillion) and other marketable assets
(€1.17 trillion). Other marketable assets include
European debt (the debts of EU rescue funds and
the European Investment Bank). On top of those
marketable assets, the ECB also accepts as
collateral non-marketable assets, mostly credit
claims17. Being non-marketable, such assets
cannot be within the scope of an asset-purchase
programme, unless they are securitised.
Part of the eligible collateral has already been
pledged in the context of the ECB’s refinancing
operations and is therefore not available for pur-
chase for the moment (Figure 10). With the repay-
ment of the three-year LTRO, at the latest on its
terminal date of February 2015, a considerable
part of the currently-used collateral pool will be
freed. It is difficult to compare the size of the total
eligible assets to the pool of assets already used
as collateral, because the former is available in
nominal terms whereas the latter is only available
in net terms, ie taking into account the haircut
applied by the ECB.
14. The minimum grade for
marketable assets to be eli-
gible as collateral for main
ECB operations is BBB- but
ABS under standard frame-
work require AAA/Aaa rating
at issuance and single A-
rating during the life of the
security:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ub/pdf/other/collateral-
frameworksen.pdf.
15. http://www.ecb.europa.eu
/ecb/legal/pdf/l_175200907
04en00180019.pdf??d74b
b43a6071db357e77cc243
9415ebe.
16. In the permanent collat-
eral framework, only euro-
denominated securities are
accepted, but under the
temporary collateral frame-
work introduced during the
crisis, assets denominated
in USD, JPY ad GBP are also
accepted. For further details
see:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ub/pdf/other/collateral-
frameworksen.pdf.
17. http://www.ecb.europa.eu
/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp14
8.pdf.
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4.6 What to buy? A shopping list for the ECB
European debt
A natural starting point for an ECB asset-purchase
programme would be euro-area wide government
bonds, which do not exist. The closest existing
asset, which could be bought without creating too
many distortions, would be bonds issued by the
EFSF and the ESM. The bonds of the European
Union (issued by the European Commission) and
the European Investment Bank (EIB) represent
EU-wide supranational assets, but since the ECB
is an EU institution, it could also consider EU
assets. The total available euro-denominated pool
of these bonds is around €490 billion (€230 bil-
lion for EFSF/ESM, €60 billion for EU, €200 billion
for EIB).
Buying such pan-European assets would not
affect the relative yields of euro-area sovereign
debts and would not distort the market-allocation
process within the private sector, which would be
advantages. While the transmission channel
through lower yields may be weak, other channels
(portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate, wealth and
signalling) would probably work well. We therefore
recommend that the ECB buys from this pool of
assets.
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Figure 10: Eligible assets and assets used as
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Source: ECB, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pdf/collat-
eral/collateral_data.pdf?ba3bb0e0c2611c6740a278aa2ee7
818a. Note: Eligible assets are in nominal values; assets used
as ECB collateral are after haircuts and valuation issues.
Latest data available: 2013 Q4.
Government bonds
National sovereign debt offers the largest pool for
ECB purchases. The portfolio rebalancing effect
would work well, as would the exchange rate,
wealth and signalling channels. The purchases
would not distort the market allocation process
within the private sector. In principle, the case for
a government bond purchase programme is there-
fore strong. However, the purchase of national gov-
ernment debt would be more complicated for the
ECB as a supranational institution without a supra-
national euro-area treasury as counterparty, than
it was for the Fed or the Bank of England. Several
relevant issues should therefore be discussed
carefully to decide if government debt should be
purchased by the ECB.
The first issue is practical. Since there are 18 dif-
ferent sovereign debt markets, the ECB would
have to decide which sovereign debt to buy. A pro-
posal often made is to purchase government debt
based on the share of each national central bank
in ECB capital (which reflects the size of the coun-
tries in terms of GDP and population). However, to
the extent that debt-to-GDP ratios are different and
the demand for sovereign debt is different in dif-
ferent countries, the ECB purchase would alter the
spreads between countries and change the rela-
tive price of sovereign debt. Even though probably
all ECB measures have different implications for
different euro-area members (eg the SMP directly
benefitted only five governments, the three-year
LTROs were primary used by euro-area periphery
banks), influencing relative yields may expose
the ECB to political pressure by individual coun-
tries to increase or decrease the speed of pur-
chases or change its portfolio. It could also lead to
moral hazard as market pressure for reforms
would be altered.
Second, the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union prohibits extension of any kind of ECB
credit facility to public bodies, or the purchase of
government securities on the primary markets by
the ECB (the same applies to national central
banks). This treaty provision was agreed in order
to avoid the monetary financing of government
debt that could result in cross-border transfers
between taxpayers. Therefore, a purchase of gov-
ernment debt is allowed in the secondary bond
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markets only if it is done for monetary policy pur-
poses and without the risk that it would lead to the
financing of government debt. Since the goal of
asset purchase will be to meet the ECB’s primary
objective of price stability, purchase of govern-
ment bonds would be allowed if the risk of mone-
tary financing could be excluded.
Third, the ECB has a well-defined sovereign bond
purchase programme, the OMT programme, which
we support (Darvas, 2012; Wolff, 2013). The basic
idea of the OMT programme is to give the ECB a tool
to buy government bonds in order to improve
monetary policy transmission in countries under
financial assistance. It is debatable whether a QE
programme based on ECB capital keys would
undermine the logic of the OMT programme. How-
ever, we note that a purchase based on capital
keys would lead to small purchases relative to
what an OMT programme would require. For exam-
ple, buying €17.5 billion of EU sovereign debt
(one-half of our proposed €35 billion purchases)
based on capital keys, would imply that the ECB
buys €3.1 billion Italian debt per month. Condi-
tionality as required by the OMT programme may
therefore be less relevant in a QE programme. If a
country was under an OMT programme, its bonds
could be excluded from the broader QE pro-
gramme. On the other hand, buying government
debt of countries with uncertain debt dynamics
without the political OMT agreement could expose
the ECB to greater political pressures when it
wants to exit.
Fourth, experience shows that an ECB govern-
ment-bond purchase programme would be politi-
cally controversial. So far, the ECB has had two
government-bond purchasing programmes (SMP
and OMT). Both were introduced under severe
stress and both were motivated by the goal of
restoring the monetary transmission mechanism.
Both programmes were and are highly controver-
sial, not least because of different assessments
of to what extent they constitute monetary financ-
ing of government debt.
Overall, government-bond purchases would be a
natural step because the bond market is very large
and the positive effects of such a QE would be sig-
nificant. However, in a monetary union with 18 dif-
ferent treasuries, such purchases are difficult for
the economic, political and legal reasons we have
outlined. Purchases of private sector assets – if
well designed – would achieve similarly benefi-
cial effects on euro-area inflation and would pro-
tect the ECB better from political pressure. We
therefore do not recommend the purchase of gov-
ernment bonds at this stage.
Bank bonds 
The second largest asset class is bank bonds, with
€3.8 trillion available in eligible covered and
uncovered bonds. Purchasing bank bonds could
have an effect through all the major channels we
discussed: portfolio-rebalancing, lowering yields,
exchange rate, wealth and signalling. In particular,
the previous holders of those bonds would have
to find other assets to buy, while the reduction in
market yields would also reduce the yields on
newly issued bank bonds, thereby allowing banks
to obtain non-ECB financing at a lower cost. This
would improve bank profitability and may improve
the willingness of banks to lend. However, bank
bonds should be excluded from the ECB asset-pur-
chase programme until the ECB’s Comprehensive
Assessment is concluded. Until then, any ECB pur-
chases would lead to serious conflicts of interest
at the ECB and would make a proper assessment
by the ECB more difficult. Moreover, those banks
for which the outcome of the Assessment will be
unsatisfactory should continue to be excluded
from the ECB’s asset purchases until they have
implemented all the required changes in their bal-
ance sheets. This might take several months after
the completion of the Comprehensive Assess-
ment.
Corporate bonds
Eligible corporate bonds comprise the third largest
asset class with almost €1.5 trillion outstanding.
However, this amount also includes non-euro area
corporate bonds and euro-area bonds issued in
other currencies. European corporate bonds are
behaving well in terms of default: Moody’s default
report for February 2014 – which included a pre-
diction of the forward trend for defaulters – shows
that the baseline expectation is on a downward
path towards levels rarely seen since 2008, for
Europe and globally, and that the pessimistic fore-
cast is also less severe than it was in 2013.
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Figure 11: Outstanding stock of debt securities
and loans of non-financial corporations (€ billions)
Source: ECB.
While there is no precise data on their magnitude,
we estimate that the lower bound of eligible euro-
area corporate bonds would be €900 billion. In
addition, the supply of corporate bonds in the euro
area has grown considerably since 2009 (Figure
11).
Figure 12 shows the heterogeneity of corporate
bond markets in the euro area. The euro-area
corporate bond market is highly concentrated. The
main issuers of corporate bonds are French
companies, whose bonds make up 44 percent of
the total outstanding (ie €466 billion). German
and Italian corporate bonds follow at significant
distance with each about 12 percent (or around
€126 billion) of the outstanding corporate bonds.
The Netherlands comes fourth with 9.6 percent of
the outstanding (€107 billion). But thanks to the
portfolio rebalancing effect, the origin of the
corporate bonds is of less importance. The
beneficial effect would come from the fact that the
current owners of the corporate bonds would sell
their bonds and use the cash for different
purposes throughout the euro area. The origin of
the bond says little about the owners of bonds,
which are in some cases US funds. In any case,
the ECB should not choose its purchases
according to geographic origin, similar to the way
it implemented the LTRO/MRO, which led to large
amounts of liquidity going to some countries only.
In addition, the purchases would encourage new
issuance of corporate bonds everywhere and lead
to a diversification of the sources of funding (Sapir
and Wolff 2013). Lower funding costs for
corporations should induce more corporate
investment.
Asset-backed securities
Another class of assets that could be bought by
the ECB is asset-backed securities (ABS). Yearly
EU securitisation issuance – which peaked in
2008 – is much lower than in the US and has been
decreasing since 2008 (Figure 13).
The total outstanding stock of securitised products
has been stagnating at around €1.06 trillion for the
euro area compared to €2.5 trillion in the US
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(AFME, 2014). Products eligible as collateral for
the ECB amount to about €761 billion, but some
of them originate from outside the euro area. We
estimate that the lower bound of eligible euro area
ABS would be €330 billion.
It is worth highlighting that defaults on ABS in
Europe have ranged between 0.6-1.5 percent on
average, against 9.3-18.4 percent for US securiti-
sations since the start of the 2007-08 financial
crisis18. The regulatory landscape for securitised
products has also changed considerably since the
crisis and made the products safer and more
transparent19.
Considering the total amount of European ABS,
more than half (€612 billion) is based on resi-
dential mortgages (see Table 1 below), which were
among the best performing category of securitised
products (S&P, 2013) and would therefore be a
natural target for ECB asset purchases. SME ABS
constitute a smaller part (€116 billion). The ABS
stock outstanding is unequally distributed across
countries, with the main issuers being different
from the main issuers of corporate bonds. ABS pur-
chases would be concentrated on the Nether-
lands, Spain and Italy, and could therefore be a
good geographical complement to corporate-bond
Table 1: Securitisation in Europe. outstanding stock in 2013Q4 (€ billions)
ABS CDO CMBS RMBS SME WBS TOTAL
Austria 0.3 0.2 1.8 2.3
Belgium 0.1 0.2 63.3 17.8 81.4
Finland 0.6 0.5 1.1
France 22.6 2.0 10.2 1.9 0.5 37.3
Germany 35.8 2.2 10.6 15.3 5.9 0.1 69.9
Greece 14.3 1.8 4.3 7.2 27.6
Ireland 0.3 0.2 0.4 37.6 38.5
Italy 50.5 3.5 10.1 85.6 28.2 0.9 178.9
Netherlands 2.3 0.9 2.5 249.7 8.0 263.5
Portugal 4.2 26.2 5.3 35.7
Spain 27.0 0.5 0.4 118.0 37.7 0.0 183.6
Pan Europe* 2.0 33.9 13.0 0.2 3.2 0.2 52.4
Multinational** 0.9 81.1 1.8 0.4 0.8 84.9
Selected euro-area total 160.9 123.9 41.2 612.3 115.8 3.0 1057.2
Source: AMFE (2014). Note: All volumes in €. ABS: asset-backed securities for which collateral types include auto loans. credit
cards. loans (consumer and student loans) and other. CDO: Collateralised Debt Obligations denominated in a European cur-
rency, regardless of country of collateral. CMBS: Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. RMBS: Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities. SME: Securities backed by small- and medium- sized enterprises. WBS: Whole Business Securitisation: a securiti-
sation in which the cash flows derive from the whole operating revenues generated by an entire business or segmented part
of a larger business. * Collateral from multiple European countries is categorised under ‘PanEurope’ unless collateral is pre-
dominantly (over 90 percent) from one country. ** Multinational includes all deals in which assets originate from a variety of
jurisdictions. This includes the majority of euro-denominated CDOs.
purchases, which would be concentrated in
France, Germany and Italy.
An ECB purchase could promote the development
of securitisation in the euro area. The potential for
securitisation is relevant, because many loans
would qualify for securitisation. In March 2014,
the outstanding amount of loans in the EU to non-
financial corporations stood at €4.2 trillion, and to
households at €5.2 trillion20. From a monetary
policy perspective, it would be very beneficial to
create ABS that are based on a portfolio of Euro-
pean assets. Ideally, the credit risk should be
pooled at the level of the private sector, thereby
deepening cross-border financial integration.
However, the ECB should not wait for develop-
ments in the ABS market before it starts buying
securitised products.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Low inflation in the euro area is particularly dan-
gerous, given high private and public debt levels in
several euro-area countries and the need for rela-
tive price adjustment between the euro-area core
and periphery. According to recent ECB forecasts,
average euro-area inflation is not expected to
return to close to two percent in the medium term.
18. http://www.bis.org/
review/r140407a.htm; S&P
reports that the cumulative
downgrade rate in the
period between mid-2007
and end-Q3 2013 was 33.8
percent, meaning that the
S&P ratings on two-thirds of
European structured
finance notes have either
been stable or have risen
since mid-2007. S&P also
points out that default
trends vary substantially
for different asset classes,
with consumer transactions
(ie RMBS, covered bonds
and consumer ABS) gener-
ally outperforming corpo-
rate transactions (ie
corporate securitisation,
CMBS and other ABS).
19. Retention requirements
– which should lead sellers
of ABS to monitor carefully
the underlying collateral –
have been introduced in the
context of the EU Capital
Requirements Directive,
and the EBA is working on
the technical details (ie 5
percent retention require-
ment); see
https://www.eba.europa.eu/-
/eba-publishes-final-draft-
technical-standards-on-secur
itisation-retention-rules.
20. According to Darvas
(2013), out of this €4.2 tril-
lion, the stock of SME loans
in the EU in 2010 was
approximately  €1.7 trillion,
and the largest stock of SME
loans was in Spain
(€356bn), followed by Ger-
many (€270bn), Italy
(€206bn) and France
(€201bn).
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The ECB’s commitment to its communicated objec-
tive of keeping inflation “below but close to two
percent inflation in the medium term” has there-
fore been undermined. In our view, it was a major
mistake not to ease monetary conditions at the
time that the ECB’s own forecast signalled that
inflation will not return to two percent in the
medium turn. Also, government policies, including
on bank restructuring and public investment,
should have been implemented some time ago as
a safeguard against the disinflationary process.
We also showed that inflation forecasts and
expectations about the return to normal inflation
have proved too optimistic, both in the euro area
recent years and in Japan for almost two decades.
To effectively address the risk of persistently low
inflation, the ECB should act. Cutting ECB interest
rates further and reducing the ECB’s deposit rate
for banks below zero would help but is unlikely to
have a sizeable impact. Designing a new very
long-term (eg three years or longer) refinancing
operation would not be very effective either,
because liquidity conditions have normalised and
banks now have a preference for paying back
three-year LTROs earlier. Stopping the sterilisation
of the government bond holdings from the Securi-
ties Markets Programme (SMP) would be unwise,
because that programme had a specific purpose
with the stated feature of sterilisation.
The best option for the ECB, with the greatest
potential to sizeably influence inflation and infla-
tionary expectations, is an asset-purchase pro-
gramme.  We recommend that the ECB starts an
open-ended programme of €35 billion per month
of asset purchases and reviews this amount after
three months to see if its size needs to be
changed. Using empirical estimates from the liter-
ature and our assessment, €35 billion per month
of purchases over the course of a year could lift
inflation by 0.8-1.0 percentage points. The asset-
purchase programme should only start to be cut
back when inflation has increased and medium-
term inflation expectations are anchored at two
percent. When inflation has stabilised close to but
below two percent, the purchased assets should
be sold gradually at a pace that does not under-
mine inflationary expectations. However, if infla-
tion expectations rise significantly above two
percent, the sale of assets should be accelerated
and standard monetary policy tools should also
be deployed to fight inflation.
In terms of available assets, we recommend that
the ECB purchases privately-issued debt securi-
ties and EFSF, ESM, EU and EIB bonds, but not gov-
ernment bonds. The purchase of government
bonds can be problematic if there is a government
solvency risk, and would be politically controver-
sial. The combined stock of EFSF/ESM/EU/EIB
bonds suitable for purchases is €490 billion. In
terms of private debt instruments, we advise that
the whole range of assets that are eligible as col-
lateral at the ECB without further credit rating
requirements should be considered. The total pool
of such assets is €7 trillion. Of these, corporate
bonds (for which we estimate that at least €900
billion are suitable for purchases) and asset
backed securities (ABS, at least €330 billion suit-
able for purchases) are preferable, while the
bonds of sound banks could be considered only
after the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of the
banking system has been completed. We there-
fore recommend that before the completion of the
comprehensive assessment, the ECB starts
monthly purchases of €15 billon of corporate
bonds, €8 billon of ABS and €12 billion of
EFSF/ESM/EU/EIB bonds.
Given the relative size of the purchases compared
to the total size of the respective markets, the mis-
pricing of risk would be limited and the ECB would
not take on board much risk if a sufficiently diver-
sified portfolio of assets is purchased. We also
highlight that the ECB’s Treaty-based primary man-
date is maintaining price stability and there is no
prohibition of monetary operations that exposes
the ECB to potential losses and profits. However, it
is also clear that the ECB should avoid exposure
to unchecked political and private sector pres-
sures that could result in delays to the reversal of
asset purchases, which would undermine the
bank’s price stability mandate.
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